action series
PanoSent: A Panoptic Sextuple Extraction Benchmark for Multimodal Conversational Aspect-based Sentiment Analysis
Luo, Meng, Fei, Hao, Li, Bobo, Wu, Shengqiong, Liu, Qian, Poria, Soujanya, Cambria, Erik, Lee, Mong-Li, Hsu, Wynne
While existing Aspect-based Sentiment Analysis (ABSA) has received extensive effort and advancement, there are still gaps in defining a more holistic research target seamlessly integrating multimodality, conversation context, fine-granularity, and also covering the changing sentiment dynamics as well as cognitive causal rationales. This paper bridges the gaps by introducing a multimodal conversational ABSA, where two novel subtasks are proposed: 1) Panoptic Sentiment Sextuple Extraction, panoramically recognizing holder, target, aspect, opinion, sentiment, rationale from multi-turn multi-party multimodal dialogue. 2) Sentiment Flipping Analysis, detecting the dynamic sentiment transformation throughout the conversation with the causal reasons. To benchmark the tasks, we construct PanoSent, a dataset annotated both manually and automatically, featuring high quality, large scale, multimodality, multilingualism, multi-scenarios, and covering both implicit and explicit sentiment elements. To effectively address the tasks, we devise a novel Chain-of-Sentiment reasoning framework, together with a novel multimodal large language model (namely Sentica) and a paraphrase-based verification mechanism. Extensive evaluations demonstrate the superiority of our methods over strong baselines, validating the efficacy of all our proposed methods. The work is expected to open up a new era for the ABSA community, and thus all our codes and data are open at https://PanoSent.github.io/
ReLExS: Reinforcement Learning Explanations for Stackelberg No-Regret Learners
Huang, Xiangge, Li, Jingyuan, Xie, Jiaqing
With the constraint of a no regret follower, will the players in a two-player Stackelberg game still reach Stackelberg equilibrium? We first show when the follower strategy is either reward-average or transform-reward-average, the two players can always get the Stackelberg Equilibrium. Then, we extend that the players can achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium in the two-player game under the no regret constraint. Also, we show a strict upper bound of the follower's utility difference between with and without no regret constraint. Moreover, in constant-sum two-player Stackelberg games with non-regret action sequences, we ensure the total optimal utility of the game remains also bounded.
AI in Action Series - Part One
I had the pleasure of meeting the remarkable Angela Yin (Head of Organisational Development) and hearing her story at Satalia. For my part, I'd been a traveller through the most amazing period of workplace change but at times I was nurtured through organisations where the gut was king in decision-making, hierarchy was all-knowing and the data was something we spent too much of our time collating and storing. As someone who has always embraced the opportunity Technology offers but doesn't lose sight of the need for dialling up our humanity, I was intrigued by the Satalia story and liked how it answered some of the cynics out there who believe this data-driven organisation is a fantasy. I sat down with Angela, in the comfort of an old bank vault, which is now the Islington Rocketspace hub and asked her to share her story with us. I'll cover it over a 3 part series of blogs and ask for any input on future questions to cover.